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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
But in such cases the question of the invasion of private premises is not in-
volved. In the principal case the Court was forced to declare expressly
that telephone wires, which the dissenting justices insisted were an ex-
tension of private premises which called for a similar extension of the pro-
tection afforded by the fourth amendment, could be interfered with at the
will of Federal officers.
Wire tapping is a crime in over thirty states, as Mr. Justice Brandeis
emphasizes in his dissent. It is a crime in the State of Washington, in
which the principal case arose. The majority of the Court holds in the in-
stant case that the commission of a crime against state law by Federal of-
ficials is not ground for holding a search and seizure to be in violation of
the fourth amendment. But see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis, 1. c. 573. Also, the brief for the Government desclaimed and
frowned upon the illegal act of wire tapping. See marginal note, 48 S. Ct.,
1. c. 575. It is hoped that the decision of the majority is not the final word
upon this subject. M. E. C., '29.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-STATE TAx or FEDERAL INSTRUMEN-
TALITY.-A Mississippi statute provided for a tax of three cents on each
gallon of gasoline sold in the state. The state sued to recover taxes on
sales made by an oil company to the Federal Government for use of its
Coast Guard Fleet and Veterans' Hospital. The oil company did not in-
clude the tax in its price to the Government, and contended on writ of error
to the Supreme Court that if this statute wer construed to impose taxes
on such sales, it would be repugnant to the Federal Constitution. Held
(the court being divided five to four), that the necessary operation of the
statute when so construed would be directly to retard, impede, and burden
the exertion by the United States of its constitutional powers to operate
the fleet and hospital. Panhandle Oil Company v. State of Mississippi ex
rel. Knox, (1928), 72 L. Ed. 517; 48 S. Ct. 451.
Beginning with MeCulloch v. Maryland (1819), 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed.
579, a long line of cases has upheld the principle that the state governments
cannot lay a tax upon the constitutional means employed by the Govern-
ment of the Union to execute its constitutional powers--although McCul-
loch v. Maryland itself did not go as far as since has been believed. Dab-
bins v. Commissioners of Erie County (1842), 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. Ed. 1022;
The Banks v. The Mayor (1868), 7 Wall. 16, 19 L. Ed. 57; Weston v. City
of Charleston (1829), 2 Pet. 448, 467, 7 L. Ed. 481; Van Brocklin 'v. Ander-
son (1886), 117 U. S. 151, 29 L. Ed. 845, 6 S. Ct. 670; Choctaw 0. & G. R.
Co. v. Harrison (1914), 235 U. S. 292, 59 L. Ed. 234, P5 S. Ct. 27; Indian
Terr. Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma (1915), 240 U. S. 522, 60 L. Ed.
779, 36 S. Ct. 453; Gillespie v. Oklahoma (1921), 257 U. S. 501, 66 L. Ed.
338, 42 S. Ct. 171. The opinion in the last-named case was written by Mr.
Justice Holmes, Justices Pitney, Brandeis, and Clarke dissenting. Mr.
Justice Holmes voiced the chief dissent in the instant case, and it is singu-
lar to note that Justice Butler, in writing the opinion of the Court, says,
"The strictness of that rule (that the States may not burden or interfere
with execution of governmental powers) was emphasized in Gillespie v.
Oklahoma."
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In United States v. Bean (1918), 253 F. 1, the Court states it to be "the
universal rule that every instrumentality lawfully employed by the United
States to execute its constitutional laws and exercise its lawful govern-
mental authority is necessarily exempt from State taxation or interfer-
ence." Quaere, whether the operation of the rule should not depend on the
practical application and effect of the tax as applied and enforced. See
Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston (1873), 18 Wall. 5, 30, 31, 21 L. Ed. 787; West-
ern U. Telegraph Co. v. Atty. Gen. (1887), 125 U. S. 530, 31 L. Ed. 790, 8
S. Ct. 961; Wagner v. Covington (1919), 251 U. S. 95, 64 L. Ed. 157, 40 S.
Ct. 93; Shaffer v. Carter (1919), 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. Ed. 157, 40 S. Ct. 93;
Metcalf v. Mitchell (1925), 269 U. S. 514, 70 L. Ed. 384, 46 S. Ct. 172.
These cases take into consideration the effect of the tax on efficiency in per-
forming the Federal function. Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds, in dissenting opinions in the principal case, hold that the question
of interference with the Government is one of reasonableness and degree,
and that the Federal Constitution must receive a practical construction.
But from most of the authorities it appears that the Supreme Court has
looked only to the subject matter on which the state tax fell. "The prin-
ciple of McCullough v. Maryland has never since been departed from, and
has often been reasserted and applied." Farmers Bank v. Minnesota
(1918), 282 U. S. 516, 58 L. Ed. 706, 34 S. Ct. 354, citing Osborn v. U. S.
Bank (1824), 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204; Home Savings Bank v. Des
Moines (1906), 205 U. S. 503, 51 L. Ed. 901, 27 S. Ct. 571; Grether v.
Wright (1896), 75 F. 742, 753. Thus, United States securities may not be
taxed. Weston v. Charleston, supra. A State cannot tax the franchise of
a transcontinental railroad company chartered by Congress, Calif. v. Cen-
tral Pac. R. R. (1887), 127 U. S. 1, 32 L. Ed. 150, 8 S. Ct. 1073; nor lands
in possession of an Indian tribe, New York Indians (1866), 5 Wall. 761, 18
L. Ed. 708; Choate v. Trapp (1911), 224 U. S. 665, 56 L. Ed. 941, 32 S. Ct.
565; nor the income derived from such lands by a lessee, Gillespie v. Okla-
hosma, supra. Power of the State to legislate in other directions is similar-
ly limited. Thus a Soldiers' Home maintained by the Government is not
subject to state food laws. In re Thomas (1897), 82 F. 304. The prin-
cipal case apparently has extended to an unreasonable degree the doctrine
that a State cannot tax an instrumentality of the Federal Government.
But judging from the later case of Long v. Rockwood (1928), 72 L. Ed. 537,
48 S. Ct. 463, which held that a state cannot, under the provisions of the
Federal Constitution, tax royalties for the use of patents, the tendency is in
favor of a still broader interpretation of this doctrine. However, it is im-
portant to note that the decision in that case was also rendered by a divided
court of five to four. J. J. C., '30.
CoRPoRATIoNs-PowER OF FOREIGN JURISDICTION TO TRANSFER TITLE
TO STOCK CERTIFICATEs.-Certificates of shares in a New Jersey corporation,
transferable in blank and so endorsed, owned by Pilger, a citizen and resi-
dent of Germany, were seized in London during the war by the Public Trus-
tee (custodian of enemy property). In accordance with the laws of Eng-
land, an order was issued vesting title in the Public Trustee. Pilger seeks
to compel the corporation, in an action brought at its domicil, to transfer
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